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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
During the Maoist period, urban development waslimited. The regime fostered anti-urban sentimentand cities were designed for production. With the
reforms, things changed. Surplus labour in the countryside
migrated to the cities to work in the new areas of economic
activity: in twenty-five years, the urban population tripled,
exceeding the half billion mark by 2003. Over the period,
there were marked changes in living conditions for urban
households. Their purchasing power was reduced, apart-
ments became more spacious and comfortable and the con-
sumption of energy rose sharply. 
Urban development can cause a city to emit more or less green-
house gases according to the energy intensity of two specific
consumption areas: thermal comfort and transport. The energy
efficiency of these two urban systems, which represent a signif-
icant proportion of total energy consumption, is a key element
in achieving the Sustainable City in China—as it is, moreover,
in other countries where rapid urbanisation is in process. So the
initial phase, the building of the city, is crucial. In effect, it fixes
the city in a particular model of energy dependence.
Over twenty years, China has managed big reductions in the
energy intensity of its industry. But how energy efficient is
China’s urbanisation? Are its housing conditions and trans-
port energy efficient, or do they threaten adverse effects on
the climate for decades to come?
In this article, we shall look first at the extent of urban de-
velopment before going on to estimate the consumption of
fossil energy in building the cities. Then we shall examine
the energy dependence that develops at the same time as
the cities are erected, focusing on consumption related to
housing conditions and transport.Demographic  explosion in  thecit i es
The urbanisation of populations is statistically difficult to es-
timate, in China even more than elsewhere. The designation
criteria for the urban population have been modified several
times over since the start of the reforms, and one has to ac-
cept some margin of error. Here we take as our source the
United Nations data, which have been adjusted to present-
day criteria((1).
According to these statistics, the rate of urbanisation has of-
ficially increased from 17.9% in 1978 to 36% in 2000 and
40.5% in 2005. Thus, the urban population has tripled in
twenty-five years,  between 1978 and 2003, reaching a total
of 520 million city dwellers. According to the UN, by 2030
the number will have risen to 870 million (see figure 1). So
between 10 and 16 million newcomers are expected in the
cities every year.
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As a proportion of China’s energy bill, the non-industrial sectors appear almost secondary, so great is the amount of
industrial consumption. Energy consumed for transport, housing and services adds up to only half the energy
required by Chinese industry. Yet, since the start of the reforms, total urban consumption has grown ever larger
alongside the secondary or industrial sector. The structure of China’s energy consumption has altered considerably
during this period because of industrial changes and the rapid urbanisation of the country. Urban development has
led to strong growth in energy consumption within these sectors.
1. United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, New York, United
Nations, http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wup2003/WUP2003Report.pdf,











While these figures do allow us to estimate the urban demo-
graphic explosion, they do not give us a precise picture.
There are elements within the urbanisation process that can-
not be effectively estimated. First of all, there is the “float-
ing population”, those people from the countryside who
have arrived in the cities without residential permits: they
are estimated at 20% of the urban population((2).Then, one
cannot ignore “latent urbanisation”, the industrialisation of
rural counties in the east of the country that have not yet ac-
quired the status of towns((3).
Indeed, town status requires official approval. Towns, once
designated as such, are entitled to financial grants from
government, funding for investment, and for the improve-
ment and maintenance of the infrastructure. The designa-
tion of new towns or the downgrading of old ones is thus
a means whereby the state can accelerate or slow down
urban development. In the mid 1980s, the central govern-
ment relaxed its control over designating towns. Numerous
rural counties or prefectures were then upgraded into
towns((4).These changes of administrative status were facili-
tated by the new development strategy favouring the cities
(SEZs and open coastal cities) and industrialisation in
rural areas((5).
Faced with the rapidly increasing numbers of towns and
cities, Beijing resumed control from 1997 onwards of the
re-designation of rural counties. Central government re-
duced by more than 10% the number of cities with that sta-
tus. In 2003, 660 cities were listed, two-thirds of them hav-
ing populations of over 500,000 people. At that date, 174
cities were officially listed as having more than a million in-
habitants, 33 of them having over two million (see figure
2). Between 1978 and 1998, 475 cities were created,
whereas only 61 had been created during the thirty years
of the Maoist period. Demographic growth within the
cities and the increase in their number was reflected in an
unprecedented surge of construction.Rapid urban construction
This burst of city-building saw the creation of new cities and
the rebuilding of those already existing. The construction of
buildings and urban infrastructure expanded rapidly. Table 1
describes this development between 1990 and 2004. Within
those fourteen years, built-up areas, road surfaces and
sewage systems quadrupled. Over the same period, residen-
tial areas increased in extent five times over. Speaking gen-
erally, more than half China’s buildings were built during the
1990s and that total was increased by half again at the start
of the new century.
Figure 1. Rural population and urban population from 1978 to 2003 (in thousands)
2. C. W. Pannell, “China’s Continuing Urban Transition”, Environment and Planning A, vol.
XXXIV, n° 9, 2002, pp. 1571-1589.
3. L. J. C. Ma, “Urban Transformation in China, 1949-2000: a Review and Research
Agenda”, Environment and Planning A, vol. XXXIV, n° 9, 2002, pp. 1545-1569.
4. The procedure governing the change of status, from county to town, was validated in
1984, with the tacit acceptance at central government level of an amalgam of several
enacted principles.
5. G. C. S. Lin, “The Growth and Structural Change of Chinese Cities: a Contextual and
Geographic Analysis”, Cities, vol. XIX, n° 5, 2002, pp. 299-316.
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Since the start of the 1980s, growth in the national stock of
accommodation has been faster than the growth in popula-
tion. Living space per resident in urban areas has gone up
from ten square metres in 1990 to almost 14 square metres
from 2000 onwards. While the number of people per house-
hold is falling, living space is rising, though it is still far be-
hind the average living space in developed countries, which
is 35 square metres per person. So the outlook for the build-
ing sector remains good for decades to come.
Urban development is at the heart of China’s economic
growth, placed there by the transition from planned econ-
omy to market economy. Suppliers of raw materials have
been under heavy pressure to respond to the growing de-
mand for building materials. 
Early on, the authorities sought to improve the energy effi-
ciency of these very intensive industries, which were held
back by archaic technology, inefficient production methods
and ill-adapted industrial organisation. Thus, the Sixth Five-
Year Plan (1981-1985) and the Seventh Five-Year Plan
(1986-1990) had a significant impact on the energy effi-
ciency of heavy industry. Over the period 1980 to 1990, it
is estimated that 85% of the drop in the energy intensity of
industry was due to falls in the intensity of production
processes for chemicals, machinery, metals and building ma-
terials((6). But as market pressures built up in these sectors,
programmes for controlling energy became less effective. In
the 1990s, the relative liberalisation of prices accentuated
this process still further. Yet, there is still a long way to go
before reaching the levels of energy intensity in the devel-
oped countries.
In the industrial field, it is heavy industry that is responsible
for nearly 80% of energy consumption. The highest consum-
ing sectors are ferric metals and building materials, which ac-
counted respectively for 30.7% and 21.4% of all industrial
energy consumption in 2000. By itself, Chinese steel-mak-
ing accounts for nearly 10% of the country’s total consump-
tion of energy. Industries supplying non-metallic materials,
and most importantly the cement producers, also account for
10% of the country’s total energy consumption. In energy
terms, China’s steel-making and cement-production are inef-
ficient industries. Their production processes use about one-
third more energy than those in developed countries.
The construction of buildings and infrastructure in urban
areas are the main outlets for the national suppliers of raw
materials. So Chinese cities have been built from materials
with a carbon content one-third higher than in developed
countries. What is more, the quality of these materials
seems partly responsible for the buildings’ low energy effi-
ciency. After a twenty-year tendency for the energy intensity
of the Chinese economy to fall, the increase over the early
Figure 2. Growth in the number of cities according to size
6. J. E. Sinton and M. D. Levine, “Changing Energy Intensity in Chinese Industry the
Relative Importance of Structural Shift and Intensity Change”, Energy Policy, vol. XXII, n°
3, 1994, pp. 239-255.
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2000s marks a worrying development. Energy consump-
tion is increasing exponentially because of the pace of
urban construction (the space occupied by buildings has
doubled over five years). The high demand for raw mate-
rials is in large part responsible for this new tendency,
taken together with the new urban demand. For the first
time since 1980, the energy intensity of the Chinese econ-
omy is on the rise.Alarming prospect s  fo r  energyconsumption in construction
Drawing up an urban balance-sheet for the consumption of
energy and CO2 emissions is not an exact science. On the
one hand, the energy data is not helpful because the inven-
tory of emissions is compiled at the national or provincial
level. On the other, the geographic data depends on the def-
initions and limits accorded to the cities: sometimes these
yield very contrasting results. Thus we shall attempt here to
account for emissions for urban non-industrial purposes,
based on national data((7).
The energy consumed in construction can be understood as
being in addition to that consumed by the residential and
service sectors. It represents a quarter of all the energy con-
sumed in 2000 and is expected still to represent over one-
third by 2020((8). Figure 3 shows the total cumulative con-
sumption by the residential and service sectors since 1990.
We may observe a sizable drop in the consumption of coal
during the 1990s; a switching of energy sources during that
same decade; and a return to coal in recent years.
Between 1990 and 2000, urban emissions of CO2 from con-
struction remained stable, but this development is associated
with a combination of different dynamics observed since the
start of the reforms. Firstly, the authorities invested heavily
in energy efficiency programmes to reduce coal consump-
tion. In addition, numerous technological and organisational
improvements were adopted to solve various problems: the
shortage of mining enterprises, mining accidents, atmos-
pheric pollution in the cities, environmental damage in rural
areas, overcrowding on the railways and wasting of re-
sources.
Then, the more the Chinese economy was taken over by the
market, the greater became the need for price reforms to con-
trol the consumption of energy. So from 1993 onwards, the
authorities deregulated energy prices. Between 1993 and
1996, the price of coal tripled, the price of electricity went
up by 3.5 times and oil prices rose by more than 4.8 times((9).
Table 1. Growth in city size and growth in urban infrastructures
7. We offer these figures without including those for biomass, much used in rural areas. In
terms of energy consumption, biomass would represent at least as much as the total for
other residential and services consumption. We should remember that biomass is not
counted in CO2 emissions. It is considered as renewable energy so long as it is not con-
sumed faster than biological renewal.
8. R. M. Yao, B. Z. Li, K. Steemers, “Energy Policy and Standard for Built Environments in
China”, Renewable Energy, vol. XXX, n° 13, 2005, pp. 1973-1988.
9. Oil prices went on rising after the 1990s because of the increase in world prices, where-
as the price of electricity went up by very little between 1998 and 2003. By contrast,
coal prices fell between 1998 and 2000.
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In the second half of the 1990s, the fall in the pace of eco-
nomic growth had a considerable impact on coke consump-
tion. Experts are agreed that the officially declared growth
rates were greatly overvalued. Indeed, the drop in the con-
sumption of energy indicates a greater level of economic
deflation over that period((10). Lastly, the programming er-
rors in the electronics sector in the early 1990s were re-
flected several years afterwards in an under-capacity of pro-
duction, which also limited the demand for coal. In the
end, we may observe a direct lessening in the demand for
coal at the end of the decade. It enabled consumers to
choose a better quality coal producing less cinder and hav-
ing a higher calorific value. This phenomenon allowed the
electronics sector to cut its coal consumption by thirty
megatons and its end users to cut theirs, probably by the
same amount((11).
The fall in the consumption of coal during the 1990s was
reflected in the development of new energy sources. In
1980, in the residential sector, coal furnished 90% of the
energy consumed. By 2000, it accounted for 36%. On the
one hand, coal burning had become more efficient; on the
other, new energy sources were developed. With the re-
building of the cities, China’s urban households used less
and less coal for heating and cooking. Increasingly, they
had access to electricity, to town gas, to natural gas and to
district heating networks, as evidenced by the rate of
growth of such networks (see table 1). 
The pace at which consumers were turning to alternative
fuels was remarkable. Consumption of gas, oil and electric-
ity grew at an annual rate, for all three, of 30% over a pe-
riod of fifteen years. Thus, consumption of electricity and oil
grew six-fold between 1990 and 2005. Each of these fuels
now provides a quarter of the total energy consumed in the
residential construction and service sectors.
Two-thirds of the energy usage in construction goes into
heating and air conditioning (see figure 4). Thermal comfort
is therefore one of the key factors in the potential energy de-
mand of developing countries. In China, district heating net-
works are considered three times less efficient than those in
developed countries, climatic conditions being equal((12). To
achieve an improvement in the energy performance in this
field, it seems necessary for heating sources and distribution
networks to be upgraded. Above all, it is essential for build-
ings to be better insulated.
Ever since 1950, only the 15 provinces to the north of the
Yangtse are entitled to central heating. To the south of the
river, no heating system is deemed necessary. In the north,
Figure 3. Total cumulative consumption by residential and services sectors (1990-2005)
10. T. G. Rawski, “What is Happening to China’s GDP Statistics?”, China Economic Review,
Vol. XII, n° 4, 2001, pp. 347-354.
11. J. E. Sinton and D G Fridley, “What Goes Up: recent Trends in China’s Energy
Consumption”, Energy Policy , vol. XXVIII, n° 10, 2000, pp. 671-687.
12. C. Barbier, “Secteur résidentiel dans les pays émergents et politique climatique interna-
tionale, Idées pour le débat”, n° 5, Iddri, 2005, 34 pp.
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city heating systems are based on archaic infrastructure de-
signed by the local administrators. City districts were pro-
vided with little boilers, coal-burning and very inefficient.
The old pipes were leaky and there was no provision for reg-
ulating or programming the supply of heat. So there was
considerable wastage. For some years, the authorities have
been attempting to renew the stock of boilers, so as to re-
duce coal consumption and improve the quality of the air in
the winter. Most importantly, numerous combined heat and
power plants were built helping to improve output of energy
and to develop heating networks. The invoicing system has
also been adapted to allow households to pay for their heat-
ing on an individual basis. Since 2003, bills are sent out to
the end users and meters have to be installed in existing net-
works (which is already compulsory for new buildings).
To the south of the Yangtse, the concept of thermal comfort
is relatively new, but it is of particular concern with the de-
velopment of air conditioning. Electric ventilating fans are
used, which provide warmth in winter as needed and cool-
ness in summer. Since the end of the 1990s, this technology
has been quickly developed. In 1995, there were about ten
air conditioning units per 100 houses; within ten years there
were over 70. A survey carried out in 1999 showed that
61% of apartments in Beijing had an air conditioner, 72% in
Shanghai and 88% in Guangzhou((13). The usage of these ap-
pliances depends on the local climate and on the cost of
electricity relative to household income. Generally speaking,
in the big southern cities, air conditioning consumes more
household electricity than anything else.
So air conditioning is a major factor in the growth of elec-
tricity consumption. For that reason, Shanghai’s electricity
usage for the summer is twice as great as for spring or au-
tumn((14). Thus, energy demand arising from air conditioning
has a still more worrying impact on greenhouse gas emis-
sions than that arising from heating: firstly, because the out-
put from these appliances is very poor and their power re-
quirement is very high; and, secondly, the leakages and re-
cycling problems with these appliances can have a serious ef-
fect on the climate((15). According to Long et al. (2005), the
use of air conditioning in the richest provinces during 2005
caused emissions of 32 megatons of CO2.
Apart from the energy efficiency of heating or air condition-
ing appliances, the thermal insulation of buildings is a cru-
cial factor in controlling energy consumption due to heating
and air conditioning, which in turn has an impact on the con-
sumption of coal. Good insulation means lower energy de-
mand for thermal comfort; so it plays a significant role in lim-
iting China’s emissions of CO2.
From 1986 onwards, the state attempted to impose thermal
standards on the design of residential buildings in the cold
regions (the north, north-east and north-west). These stan-
dards were designed to reduce by 30% the consumption of
energy for heating, as compared with non-insulated accom-
modation. Unfortunately, these guidelines were not compul-
sory and so were largely ignored. In 1995, the central au-
thorities upped their demands, asking for a 50% reduction
in energy consumption for heating in new buildings. For
these standards to be applied they had to be endorsed by
regulations issued by the provincial authorities. But these au-
thorities do not always appreciate what is at stake. It is esti-
mated that only 5.7% of buildings conform to the ruling be-
cause of poor communications across the country and the
absence of any mechanism for validating the results((16). In
Figure 4. Distribution of energy consumption
in construction
13. D. Brockett, D. Fridley, J. M. Lin, J. Lin, “A Tale of Five Cities: The China Residential
Energy Consumption Survey”, ACEEE Summer Study on Building Energy Efficiency,
2002, www.china.lbl.gov/publications/crecs.pdf, [site visited 4 February 2006].
14. W. D. Long, T. Zhong, B. H. Zhang, “Le conditionnement d’air résidentiel en Chine”, Revue
générale du froid, Jan-Feb, 2005, pp. 25-28.
15. The refrigerating gases used in these appliances (Hydrofluorocarbons: HFCs) have an
overall heating effect that is from 12 to 12,000 times higher than CO2; they also con-
tribute to the damage to the ozone layer. The Montreal Protocol relating to these sub-
stances allows China a period of grace during which it has no obligation to eliminate the
release of these gases. China is merely offered incentives to switch to using elements
less harmful to the ozone layer.
16. C. Barbier, op. cit.
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absolute terms, out of the 5.5 billion square metres of build-
ings erected between 1986 and 2002, no more than 320
million square metres do conform to national guidelines((17).
That also corresponds to a reduction in emissions of 23
megatons of CO2. Thus, out of the entire built-up area in all
Chinese cities, only 2.1% conforms to national standards.
In 2001, the central authorities set new standards for the
other Chinese regions, thus extending to the whole country
the objective of halving energy consumption for thermal
comfort. Air conditioning was particularly targeted because
of its growing use in the southern provinces, but the applica-
tion of these standards remains at the discretion of the local
authorities, some of whom do not enforce the regulations.
A programme for co-operation (on the French side, the
Agence de l’Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l’Energie,
the Agence Française de Développement, and the Fonds
Français pour l’Environnement Mondial; on the Chinese
side, the Ministry of Construction), has afforded us data on
energy efficiency in construction. The first phase of this pro-
gramme focused on building apartment blocks on sites to-
talling about 789,000 square metres in the provinces of Hei-
longjiang, Liaoning and Beijing. By building these apart-
ments in line with national standards, yearly emission reduc-
tions of 44,000 tons of CO2 have been achieved. This sav-
ing of 50% of energy consumption compared with standard
equivalent accommodation was achieved in these cold re-
gions at an extra building cost of around 7%. Unfortunately,
without the programme for co-operation, no incentive was in
place that might justify this extra cost((18).
Conforming to national standards of efficiency in construc-
tion is essential for Chinese cities to rid themselves of such
excessive energy consumption on heating an air condition-
ing. By 2005, buildings covering more than fifteen billion
square metres had already been erected in Chinese cities.
The low energy efficiency of these buildings doubles the
consumption of energy for heating or air conditioning in
these fully equipped apartment blocks. So Chinese urban
development appears to be very energy intensive for thermal
comfort purposes. 
Alongside this worrying conclusion however we can empha-
sise some very positive developments in the provision of do-
mestic hot water. For this purpose, representing 15% of the
energy consumed in construction, China is exceptional in
having very quickly become the world’s leading market for
solar water heating. In 2004, 13 million square metres of
solar panels for heating water were installed. 90% are in-
stalled in an urban environment, of which 30% is in big
cities and 60% in suburbs and smaller towns((19). This market
is experiencing rapid growth and the National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC) is calling for the instal-
lation of 150 million square metres of solar panels in 2010
and 300 million square metres in 2020.Growing motor ization andphys ical  constraints
The consumption of energy on urban transport is not based
on the use of coal but of oil, of which China has been a net
importer since 1993. During the Maoist era, consumption of
energy on urban transport was very low. At the end of the
1970s, there were practically no motor vehicles. Cities were
organised as collections of relatively autonomous work units.
In these very densely populated built-up areas, commuting
distances were reduced to the minimum. Pedal cycles and
walking were almost the only means of travel. 
In the 1980s, the cities began to spread outwards. This
phase of urban development was driven above all by the
rapid development of the bicycle. During the 1990s urban
transport began to be organised around buses, taxis and
minibuses used by enterprises to provide shuttle services.
Speaking generally, walking and cycling still accounted, dur-
ing the 1990s, for nearly two-thirds of journeys (see figure
5). Private cars were still more or less unavailable to Chi-
nese households, but company cars were increasingly to be
seen in the big cities. 
With the development of the land ownership market and the
housing market during the 1990s, social and spatial relation-
ships between employers and employees diminished. Fami-
lies now found themselves able to choose where they lived:
consequently, commuting distances greatly increased. Indus-
tries moved outward from city centres, pushed towards the
suburbs by growing land prices or by political pressure to re-
duce city centre pollution. The enterprises yielded their
space to service industries and to prestige housing. So as the
cities develop they become much less heterogeneous. This
spatial reorganisation of urban activity led to a general in-
crease in the length of people’s journeys, which in turn made
it more and more necessary for people to use motorised
forms of transport. 
17. Xinhua News Agency, 23 February 2005.
18. G. Rieb, A. Bernard, M. Bernard-Herve, “La construction en Chine”, in Jacquet et al.,
Regards sur la Terre, Les Presses de Sciences Po, 2007, pp. 93-97.
19. W. Wallace & Z. Y. Wang, “Solar Energy in China: Development Trends for Solar Water
Heaters and Photovoltaics in the Urban Environment”, Bulletin of Science, Technology &
Society, Vol. XXVI, n° 2, 2006, pp. 135-140.
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The early 2000s saw a real take-off in private car-ownership.
Ever since 1994, the Chinese state has pursued a pro-auto-
mobile industrial policy. The authorities sought to make this
sector of industry a pillar for economic growth; they sup-
ported the development of car-manufacture right across
China((20). The aim was that in a few decades the country
would have exporting businesses; it would favour their devel-
opment by profiting from the resources of the domestic mar-
ket((21).
In March 2002, in his report on government activities, the
then Prime Minister, Zhu Rongji, outlined the aims on car
ownership. He proposed to equip 20% of households with
cars by the year 2020. Starting in 2002, car sales rock-
eted((22). The national stock of cars doubled in four years ris-
ing from 8.5 million vehicles in 2000 to 17.4 million by
2004. This stock is particularly concentrated in the eastern
coastal cities and the provincial capitals. Nationally speak-
ing, the rate of car ownership is less than fifteen cars per
1000 people; but in the big cities it is more than fifty cars
per 1000 people. Beijing has the greatest concentration of
cars in China. Of the total national stock of cars 10% is con-
centrated there: ownership per 1000 people has risen to
more than 100.
This rapid growth in the national stock of cars is reflected,
of course, by a big rise in consumption of fuel. The vehicles
sold in China have far lower energy efficiency than do vehi-
cles of similar weight and size in industrialised countries. In
the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), the state did encour-
age the production, independently of foreign car makers, of
an economic Chinese car with a 1.3 litre engine. In fact, it
was difficult to realise this aim, because foreign car-makers
were reluctant to pass on their technology to Chinese enter-
prises and because fuel quality was still very poor((23).
Even though the stock of cars is growing very rapidly and
the low energy efficiency of engines accentuates the in-
crease in energy consumption for urban travel, China’s
urban transport is not tending towards energy intensity in
line with Western countries. Admittedly, the increase in
household income does increasingly permit car ownership;
but physical constraints in the cities still limit the interest in
using cars. Everywhere, in the richest cities, road congestion
has become chronic. The time taken for car journeys has be-
come considerably longer and rush hour average speeds by
Figure 5. Means of transport in various Chinese cities during the 1990s
20. Lin Gan, “Globalization of the Automobile Industry in China: dynamics and Barriers in
Greening of Road Transportation”, Energy Policy, vol. XXXI, n° 6, 2003, pp. 537-551.
21. S Stares and Z Liu, “Motorization in Chinese Cities: Issues and Actions”, in S. Stares and
Z. Liu, China’s Urban Transport Development Strategy, Washington DC, World Bank,
1995, pp. 43-104
22. We should note that the big Chinese cities advanced directly to the automobile. They
bypassed the motorcycle to avoid atmospheric and noise pollution in the city centres.
Yet, motorcycles proliferated in small towns and in the countryside.
23. J. Allaire, “Le casse-tête de l’Etat chinois: encourager la consommation automobile en
décourageant la consommation d’énergie” (The Chinese Headache: Encouraging Car
Use while Discouraging Energy Consumption), Revue de l’énergie, vol. LVI, n° 563, 2005,
pp. 29-35.
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car are sometimes lower than those by bicycle. In fact, car
owners in China are competing for the available space.
Cities in China lag behind those in developed countries in
terms of road space (see table 2). This continuing problem
derives from the density of the population, which in turn ef-
fects energy consumption for transport. 
The population density of Chinese cities is at present above
10,000, even 15,000, persons per square kilometre. The
prospects for greater car use should therefore be compared
above all with developed Asian cities of similar population den-
sity. Thus, in 1990, the great agglomeration of Tokyo and Yoko-
hama, with a population density of 7,000 persons per square
kilometre, has car ownership of around 225 cars per 1,000 in-
habitants. By comparison, American and European cities with
average population densities of 1,400 persons and 5,000 per-
sons per square kilometre respectively, had car ownership of
around 600 and 400 cars per 1,000 inhabitants. The inhabi-
tants of Tokyo-Yokohama emit an average of 1.2 tons of CO2
per head from transport. In European cities, emissions from
transport are estimated at 1.8 tons of CO2 per head, whereas
in the United States they reached 4.21 tons per head((24).
24. J. Kenworthy, F. Laube, P. Barter, T. Raad, C. Poboon, B. Guia, An International Sourcebook
of Automobile Dependence in Cities, 1960-1990, Boulder, University Press of Colorado,
2000.
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Beijing: heavy traffic during rush hour 
Table 2. Area occupied by roads in cities, as
a percentage of total city area – early 1990s
In dense urban areas, because of the concentration of in-
dividual movements, the development of the motor car
quickly encounters the obstacle of congestion. Collective
transport systems are by contrast very efficient; they
make it possible for large numbers of people to move
about within limited space. Moreover, travelling on foot
or by bicycle becomes easier when distances are
shorter((25). The Asian cities, because of their density,
have stronger incentives than Western cities for develop-
ing alternatives for motor transport. Thus, long-term use
of cars will depend on whether cities can quickly find
room for them.
This observation has been confirmed in China with the re-
cent growth in the stock of cars. In consequence, to prevent
congestion in the big cities, the Chinese authorities have
planned big increases in public transport infrastructure. Tak-
ing account of the backwardness of public transport, they
have since the late 1990s supported plans for building rail
transport networks in the big cities. In 2000, only 165 kilo-
metres of metro or tram lines were in use: by 2010, a further
800 kilometres will have been built.
The consumption of energy on transport during the coming
decades will thus depend above all on investment choices:
decisions will have to be taken between railed infrastructure
and road infrastructure, as well as between collective and in-
dividual forms of transport. Street design is also critical if
non-motorised forms of transport are to be encouraged. The
bicycle, which is still widely used across China, is the most
efficient form of transport in terms of energy consumption.
Whereas some cities are tempted to ban bicycles, city au-
thorities should keep enough cycle lanes on public roads for
as many people to use them as possible. The decisions
reached regarding mass transport or non-motorised travel will
60 N o  2 0 0 7 / 1
25. P. Newman and J. Kenworthy, Cities and Automobile Dependence. An International
Sourcebook, Brookfield, Gower Technicals, 1989.
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dictate the shape of Chinese cities and will thus determine
their dependence on oil. Conclus ion
Urban development bears heavy responsibility for energy con-
sumption and consequently for CO2 emissions. Two sectors
are particularly significant: thermal comfort and transport.
Firstly, the question of thermal comfort seems in China to
be of serious concern. The system of national standards does
not work as it should. Because of the rapid increase in the
national stock of individual electric appliances, and bearing
in mind the low energy efficiency in apartment blocks, Chi-
nese cities are developing high energy dependence on heat-
ing and air conditioning. That is reflected in a significant de-
mand for electricity and coal. To reduce the contribution of
the construction sector to global warming, the national rec-
ommendations need to be applied: new buildings must be
better insulated and existing buildings should be renovated. 
Secondly, the rapid development of motor travel leads to
ever higher consumption of oil and is restricted by shortage
of space. However, the congestion of city centres also
favours the development of alternative solutions to private
car ownership. Chinese cities could thus limit the energy
consumed in travel by providing viable collective transport
systems and by designing streets for non-motorised transport.
If the present policy for investing in collective transport is
pursued and spreads to medium-sized towns, it can lessen
dependence on oil and limit the dynamic towards reducing
arable land. 
However, some elements of the Chinese model for growth
are likely to threaten these positive developments. The de-
velopment of the cities is beginning to have a significant im-
pact on people’s demand for energy. Urban growth is en-
couraged by improving living conditions. The central author-
ities are increasingly losing control of the demand for energy.
With the expectation of rapid economic growth over the
years ahead, these uncontrolled elements could hamper the
effectiveness of government strategy in the fight against
global warming. •
• Translated by Philip Liddell
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